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NOTE
A NARROW PATH TO DIVERSITY:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REZONING PLANS
AND STRATEGIC SITE SELECTION OF SCHOOLS
AFTER PARENTS INVOLVED
Steven T. Collis*
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1 raised an important
and timely constitutional issue: whether the Constitution permits
K-12 public school districts not under existing desegregation or-
ders to use site selection of new schools or rezoning plans to
achieve racial diversity. Numerous scholars and journalists have in-
terpreted Justice Kennedy's concurrence as explicitly answering the
question in the affirmative. This Note argues that the opposite is
true. Justice Kennedy's past jurisprudence, as well as his language
in Parents Involved, favors the use of strict scrutiny. Indeed, in
Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy reveals his three principal con-
cerns: classification of individuals by race, courts interfering with
school districts in their daily functions, and the inappropriate use of
strict scrutiny when school districts do not intend to affect students
because of their race. This Note contends that all three of those
concerns militate in favor of using strict scrutiny for rezoning and
site selection plans. Such plans most likely will result in the classi-
fication of students by race, strict scrutiny of such plans will not
prevent school districts from performing their daily functions, and
courts may still implement a lower level of scrutiny when school
districts do not intend to act based on race. School districts should,
therefore, proceed with caution and ensure that any racially based
rezoning or site selection plans they use are narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling interest of diversity.
* J.D. candidate, December 2008. First and foremost, I thank my wife, Jerusha, for all her
support and love along the journey to make this Note a reality. She alone understands its meaning
and significance. I also thank Professor Joan Larsen, as well as Matt Owen and Leigh Wasserstrom.
Words cannot capture the gratitude I feel for their wonderful editorial advice, and, more importantly,
their extreme selflessness. Finally, I thank Lance Phillips, Samuel Brenner, and the rest of the Notes
Office for their final suggestions and comments.
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INTRODUCTION
Five months before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Parents
Involved,' Professor Goodwin Liu predicted that the case would "write per-
haps the final chapter of the constitutional and cultural legacy of Brown in,,2
public education. Unfortunately for lower court judges and school districts
across the nation, Professor Liu's hopeful forecast did not come to fruition.
A five-to-four majority held that school assignment plans designed to
achieve racial diversity in Seattle and Kentucky violated the Equal
Protection Clause because they classified students by race. Justice Kennedy
was the fifth vote in the majority, but he agreed only with the conclusion,
not the reasoning.3 He offered the narrowest, and therefore the controlling,
• . 4
opinion. That opinion raised, but did not answer, the following important
1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
2. Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 277 (2007).
3. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court de-
cides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the
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and timely constitutional question: whether the Constitution permits K-12
public school districts not under existing desegregation orders, in an attempt
to achieve racial diversity, to site new schools on the borders of racially dif-
ferent neighborhoods, or, alternatively, to change school attendance zones.
Some have argued that Justice Kennedy answered the question in the af-
firmative, and they encourage schools to embrace site selection and rezoning
as a constitutional means for achieving diversity.5 A deeper analysis of Jus-
tice Kennedy's reasoning, however, reveals that school districts who engage
in such practices will face strict scrutiny by the courts and will pass that
scrutiny only in the narrowest of circumstances.
Because many school districts across the country use programs similar
to those struck down in Parents Involved, this open question of constitu-
tional law is both timely and important.6 Such school districts must revise
their plans in light of the Court's holding and analysis.7 Indeed, just days
after the Court announced its decision, a lawsuit in Boston challenged a
"public school assignment plan similar to those the Justices struck down" in
Parents Involved.! School districts are scrambling to create plans "that can
pass muster with the court."9
Further, a number of school officials, scholars, and even opponents of the
use of race in any form are interpreting Justice Kennedy's opinion as an an-
swer to the constitutional question that gives full-fledged approval of school
site selection and redrawing of attendance zones in order to achieve racial
integration.0 Comments by Roger Clegg of the Center for Equal Opportunity
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds ....... (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
(1976))).
5. See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman, PICS in Focus: A Majority of the Supreme Court Reaf-
firms the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious School Integration Strategies, 35 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1, 13-16 (2007) (embracing the idea of using site selection and changing attendance zones).
6. See Maria Godoy, Parsing the High Court's Ruling on Race and Schools, NPR, June 28,
2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1 1507539 ("The 5-4 ruling.., is likely
to prompt revisions of similar plans in schools across the country.").
7. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race In Integration Plans,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at Al ("How important a limitation Justice Kennedy's opinion proves to
be may become clear only with time, as school districts devise and defend plans that appear to meet
his test.").
8. Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.con/wp/uncategorized/
first-sequel-to-school-decision/ (July 5, 2007, 17:42 EST).
9. Greenhouse, supra note 7.
10. See Kaufman, supra note 5, at 13. ("Justice Kennedy indicates that before employing the
'last resort' of student assignment based on race, a school district should attempt to meet its goal of
fostering student body diversity through means such as strategic site selection and attendance zoning
... "); Roger Clegg, A Good-If Mixed Bag .... CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, July 4, 2007,
http://www.ceousa.org/content/view/409/l14; Posting of Bryan Fair to Talking Justice, http://
communities.justicetalking.org/blogsiday 12/archive/2007107/12/not-separate-but-still-unequal.aspx
(July 12, 2007, 9:21 EST) ("Kennedy has opened the door for school officials to promote diverse
schools. My hope is that more officials will take his lead to champion equal educational opportu-
nity."); Ibram Rogers, The Weight of One Man's Opinion, DIVERSE, July 26, 2007. http://
www.diverseeducation.com/artman/publish/article_8870.shtml ("In his opinion, Kennedy provided
school districts with several alternative strategies for pursuing diversity.").
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are illustrative: "Justice Kennedy would allow school systems to locate indi-
vidual schools with the idea of promoting racial diversity in them."" Indeed,
some school districts have already put forth proposals to change attendance
zones to achieve, among other things, "demographically" balanced
schools. 12
In light of this interpretation of and reaction to Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion, this Note argues that schools should proceed with caution and that
Justice Kennedy will still require schools to face strict scrutiny if they use
racially based site selection or rezoning to achieve diversity. The constitu-
tional question is complex, and Justice Kennedy's statements were hardly
definitive. They most likely did not embrace all uses of site selection and
attendance-zone manipulation to achieve racial diversity. Indeed, to assume
otherwise is to misread Justice Kennedy's opinion and to impute to his
comments far more significance than he may have intended. Justice
Kennedy certainly raised possibilities for school districts to consider, but the
likely resolution of the constitutional question is that those districts will still
need to ensure that their site selection and rezoning plans are narrowly tai-
lored to achieve racial diversity.
Schools should understand that Justice Kennedy does not endorse
wholeheartedly all forms of school site selection and attendance-zone ma-
nipulation; rather, his reasoning and language call for the application of
strict scrutiny, which means courts will likely find that many rezoning and
siting plans do violate the Constitution. 3 Accordingly, Part I of this Note
argues in more detail that the Justices' opinions in Parents Involved left open
a constitutional question for which school districts will need an answer. Part
II then contends that Justice Kennedy's concurrence requires lower courts to
apply strict scrutiny when evaluating school site selections or changing at-
tendance zones as integrative methods, and that those who argue otherwise
may have misinterpreted Justice Kennedy's language.
I. PARENTS INVOLVED RAISED BUT DID NOT RESOLVE A TIMELY
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
This Part argues that Parents Involved left open an important issue of
constitutional law. Section L.A details the basic background of desegregation
law and argues that societal shifts created a complex environment in which
the Court decided Parents Involved. Section I.B argues that ambiguity in the
Justices' opinions regarding the effects of the holding in Parents Involved
raised but failed to answer the question of whether state officials may under
11. Clegg, supra note 10.
12. See Michael Alison Chandler, Vote on School Zones in Fairfax Pits Neighbor Against
Neighbor, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2008, at Al (discussing the extreme parental animus that emerged
when a school board proposed a measure to change attendance zones to achieve demographic and
academic balance in the school district).
13. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the Constitution use rezoning plans or strategic site selection to achieve di-
versity in schools.
A. Parents Involved Dealt with Societal Segregation,
Not Government-Sponsored Segregation
As society has shifted away from the intentional, state-sponsored segre-
gation of the past, the law has developed and created a background for
Parents Involved far different from what the Court faced in earlier decisions.
This is most evident in the case law related to race in schools. At the time of
Brown v. Board of Education,14 many states operated segregated school sys-
tems as a matter of state policy.' 5 Brown's order to schools was fairly simple:
desegregate. In the decades since Brown, however, many school systems
shifted their focus from remedying state-sponsored, or de jure, segregation
to remedying societal, or de facto, segregation." The law adjusted accord-
ingly.
The shift happened as a result of two developments: first, states that
never participated in de jure segregation decided to combat de facto segrega-
tion; 7 second, states that did practice de jure segregation kept their
integrative plans in place even after achieving what the courts call "unitary
status."" This label means that school districts under desegregation orders
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. See id. at 486 & n.1.
16. For continuity's sake, I have glossed over the Fourteenth Amendment's rich jurispru-
dence regarding racial preferences. Those developments that are crucial to this Note I will deal with
in more depth later. Suffice it to say for now that the development of the jurisprudence has been
gradual, precept upon precept as society has shifted. For a general understanding of that develop-
ment, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (introducing, though arguably not
applying, the use of strict scrutiny for reviewing racial discrimination); Green v. County Sch. Bd.,
391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that choice plans for children still violate Brown's mandate if the
children have no practical choice where to attend school and if the choice plans do not lead to de-
segregation); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that evidence of intent to burden a
particular racial group will give rise to strict scrutiny); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that a law that is racially neutral on its face and rationally
may be said to serve a permissible government purpose will not be subjected to strict scrutiny, and
that the government may adopt such a law in spite of a racial effect, but not because of its racial
effect); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 339-40 (1978) (discussing the scope of
the Equal Protection Clause as it stood in the early 1960s and how it then related to de jure and de
facto discrimination); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989) (holding that
the City of Richmond had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest for awarding municipal con-
tracts to racial minorities); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[A]II
racial classifications, imposed by whatever ... federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (hold-
ing that a point system used to ensure higher enrollment of minorities was not narrowly tailored to
achieve the asserted compelling interest of a diverse student body); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003) (reasoning that even in instances when strict scrutiny is applied, courts may defer to
government actors on whether they have a compelling interest and on whether they used a narrowly
tailored means to achieve that interest).
17. See Michael Besso, Sheff v. O'Neill: A Research Note, 34 CONN. L. REv. 315, 327
(2002) (discussing a mandate issued by state officials that schools eliminate de facto segregation).
18. See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 681 F. Supp. 730, 739-40 (1988) (holding that a
state technical college had achieved unitary status).
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by federal courts have "implemented a desegregation plan in good faith and
that the vestiges of discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practi-
cable."' 9 In other words, federal courts do not compel unitary school districts
to continue their integrative plans. Many districts, however, choose to en-
gage in integrative policies because de facto segregation still exists among
their students.2 °
While courts uniformly support the amelioration of de jure segregation,
in the years before the Parents Involved decision, they had often looked at
programs to eliminate de facto segregation with some skepticism." This was
often because school admissions programs designed to combat de facto seg-
regation prompted charges of racism and unequal protection under the law."
Thus the issue of whether schools should be engaged in the process of solv-
ing societal segregation has divided politicians, voters, and judges. This is
the background against which the Court decided Parents Involved.
B. The Justices Were Ambiguous About the Effects of
the Holding in Parents Involved
Ambiguous statements in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents In-
volved failed to resolve the constitutional question conclusively, leaving
government officials and lower courts uncertain as they devise and scruti-
nize plans to achieve diversity in public schools. His language suggests a
departure from his previous view that strict scrutiny should be applied in all
cases where racial classifications are used." His Parents Involved opinion
reflects an expansion of another strain of his reasoning in previous cases,
one concerned with the problem of stigma.14 Justice Kennedy is skeptical of
state programs that affect not only how students are perceived but how they
perceive themselves.
Parents Involved dealt with two very similar student assignment plans
under which students who wished to enroll in particular schools were denied
25
admission solely because of their race. The first, in Kentucky, operated at
19. United States v. Georgia, 171 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11 th Cir. 1999).
20. William E. Thro, The Constitutionality of Eliminating De Facto Segregation in the Public
Schools, 120 EDUC. L. REP. 895, 897 (1997) ("Nevertheless, some school districts have chosen to
make efforts to eliminate de facto segregation."); see also Besso, supra note 17, at 327-28 (describ-
ing efforts by state officials to combat de facto segregation).
21. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298-99 (discussing the negative effects that could result from
trying to ameliorate de facto segregation).
22. See, e.g., id. at 289-90.
23. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) ("[Any racial preference must face the most rigorous scrutiny by the courts.").
24. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("There is
the danger that the 'stereotypical thinking' that prompts [these] policies . . . 'stigmatizes the disad-
vantaged class ......."(quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring))).
25. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2748-51
(2007).
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the elementary school level. The plan required "all nonmagnet schools to
maintain a minimum black enrollment of 15 percent, and a maximum black
enrollment of 50 percent" in a school district that was about 34 percent
black and 66 percent white.27 Students indicated which schools they would
prefer to attend, but if a student's race would contribute to a school's "racial
imbalance," the district would not assign a student there.28 The Kentucky
school district had operated under a desegregation decree until 2000, when
the federal district court declared that the school district had achieved uni-
29tary status.
The second assignment plan, in Seattle, assigned students to one of ten
high schools, but it first allowed incoming ninth graders "to choose from
among any of the district's high schools, ranking however many schools
they wish in order of preference. 3 ° In the event that too many students opted
for the same school, the district used a series of three tiebreakers.3 The first
selected students who had "a sibling currently enrolled in the chosen
school. 32 The second used the racial composition of a particular school and
the race of the student involved.33 If an "oversubscribed school" was not
within "10 percentage points of the district's overall white/nonwhite racial
balance," a student whose race would bring the school closer to the 10%
mark was selected for that school.34 The third tiebreaker selected students
based on their geographic proximity to the school.35 Seattle was never under
a desegregation order; the district designed its plan to remedy de facto seg-
regation only.1
6
A divided Supreme Court reviewed the programs with strict scrutiny37
and held that both were unconstitutional. 3' The majority held that the
schools' programs were not narrowly tailored to achieve what the schools
claimed was their compelling interest-achieving racial diversity.3 9 Thus,
they were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. That basic
holding garnered a majority of the Court.40
26. Id. at 2749.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2750.
29. Id. at 2749.
30. Id. at 2746-47.
31. Id. at 2747.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at2751.
38. Id. at 2768.
39. Id. at 2760.
40. Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito comprised the majority. Justice
Kennedy left the other four Justices to write his concurrence. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate
December 2008]
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From there, however, the Justices failed to agree, and ambiguous state-
ments by Justice Kennedy resulted in the following unanswered
constitutional question: To what extent can school districts use race-
conscious means to achieve racial diversity in schools after Parents
Involved? Justice Kennedy's concurrence introduced the issue with less-
than-definitive language. In it, he said:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse
backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selec-
tion of new schools [and] drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods .... [I]t is unlikely any
of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.'
With these words, Justice Kennedy significantly limited the majority's oth-
erwise broad prohibition on the use of race-conscious means, and embraced
a more narrow rule that preserves the ability of school districts to achieve
what he considers a compelling interest-diversity in public schools. 4' His
language, however, is not entirely clear. He stated only that siting new
schools and rezoning are "unlikely" to "demand strict scrutiny. 43 He offered
no guarantee that they will not require strict scrutiny, and he certainly did
not promise that siting new schools or rezoning will pass the strict scrutiny
test, should courts use it.
Justice Breyer, in dissent, added to the ambiguity." It is probably safe to
assume, given the dissent's language, that Justice Breyer and the other dis-
senters would agree with Justice Kennedy regarding rezoning and site
selection. Still, Justice Breyer did not say that definitively. Rather, he fo-
cused on the plans states have used to combat de facto resegregation. 45 He
explained that various states implemented over 300 plans between 1961 and
1985.46 "A majority of these desegregation techniques," he argued, "explic-
itly considered a student's race., 47 He then averred that the controlling
opinion will make the use of race in selecting school sites unconstitutional:
concurrence, but he joined all of the plurality's opinion. Justice Stevens wrote a lone dissent, and
Justice Breyer wrote a dissent in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined.
41. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 2789. It is important to note that Gruter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), dealt
with diversity in higher education. Before Parents Involved, the Court had not addressed diversity in
K-12 public schools.
43. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952, 958 (1996)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213 (1995)) ("[I]t is
unlikely any of [the methods Kennedy lists] would demand strict scrutiny ... .
44. Id. at 2834 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 2832-33.
46. Id. at 2831. Justice Breyer discussed a wide range of different plans, emphasizing trans-
fer programs in Califomia and New York. He states that at "the state level, 46 States and Puerto Rico
have adopted policies that encourage or require local school districts to enact interdistrict or intra-
district open choice plans." Id. at 2832. Of those, eight require that the transfer lead to increased
integration. Another eleven require boards to "deny transfers that are not in compliance with the
local school board's desegregation plans." Id. He further listed plans in Arkansas, Connecticut, and
Ohio that seek to maintain a certain racial balance in schools. Id. at 2832-33.
47. Id. at 2832.
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"The fact that the controlling opinion would make a school district's use of
such criteria often unlawful (and the plurality's 'colorblind' view would
make such use always unlawful) suggests that today's opinion will require
•• ,,41
setting aside the laws of several States and many local communities.
Justice Breyer did not explain what laws or methods he thinks Parents In-
volved will invalidate, and thus it is not clear whether or not he was arguing
that the majority's holding would preclude rezoning or site selection.
Finally, the majority opinion itself did not resolve the question, and
Chief Justice Roberts's plurality opinion expressly refused to address it.
While criticizing the dissenters for "greatly exaggerat[ing] the conse-
quences" 49 of the majority's holding and dismissing their concerns as
"cataclysmic," 0 the plurality opinion declined even to take a position on
siting schools or rezoning. It merely argued that Justice Kennedy's "other
means-e.g., where to construct new schools ... implicate different consid-
erations than the explicit racial classifications at issue in these cases, and we
express no opinion on their validity-not even in dicta."5 In other words,
the Roberts plurality leaves the question entirely unanswered.
Because Parents Involved raised the question but failed to answer it,
lower courts and school districts must turn to preexisting jurisprudence for
guidance; unfortunately, that guidance proves less than clear. Siting a school
on a biracial boundary to affect its racial composition is not a new idea, but
doing so outside the remedial context is. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, the Supreme Court emphasized that there was broad
agreement that a school district may not locate a school for the purposes of
furthering segregation." Inversely, the lower courts have been clear that in
remedial situations-where a school district is under an existing desegrega-
tion order to remedy prior de jure segregation-a district may locate a
school on a biracial boundary line in order to comply with the desegregation
order.53 Further, some courts have allowed shifting attendance zones or sit-
ing of new schools even if it results in incidental segregation when the
evidence supports a finding that the school district did it for reasons not as-
sociated with race. 4 But courts have not been clear about the circumstance
48. Id. at 2833.
49. Id. at 2761 (plurality opinion).
50. Id. at 2766.
51. Id.
52. 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971); see also Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1980)
(disapproving of school board's attempt to desegregate by redrawing attendance zones in a way that
left racially identifiable black school unchanged).
53. Cf United States v. Lawrence County Sch. Dist., 799 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1986) (requir-
ing district court to implement change in school attendance zones to accomplish desegregation and
eliminate racial identification of schools as far as possible); Stell v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 724 F. Supp.
1384 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (approving city's plan involving, inter alia, revised attendance zone in order to
achieve desegregation in a district that had never achieved unitary status).
54. E.g., United States v. Georgia, 171 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a facilities
plan did not violate a desegregation order, despite causing some resegregation, when school board
acted with good faith and met other criteria); see Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d
December 20081
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presented by Justice Kennedy's suggestion: using rezoning plans or site se-
lection for integrative purposes outside the context of a desegregation
order.55
Yet clarity in this area is vital assuming that many school districts will
have to change their plans after Parents Involved and that significant weight
is placed on Justice Kennedy's opinion. Until Parents Involved, many school
districts across the country engaged in assignment plans similar to that em-
ployed in Seattle and Louisville, or in other plans that considered race.5 6
This is particularly true in areas where there had been no past de jure segre-
gation or in areas that had already achieved unitary status.57 Many school
districts saw no need to employ alternative measures until the decision in
Parents Involved.5" Now, school districts considering the use of siting or re-
zoning must mull over the constitutional question such methods raise, and
the answer is not as simple as some commentators have assumed.
II. UNDER JUSTICE KENNEDY'S REASONING, STRICT SCRUTINY IS THE
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW TO ASSESS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SITING OR REZONING PLANS
This Part argues that the broad interpretation many have given Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved is premature and that his reason-
ing supports the use of strict scrutiny to evaluate rezoning or site selection
plans. 9 Section II.A explains how the Justices align on the question of when
strict scrutiny should apply to race-based decision making and argues that
Justice Kennedy's position is not entirely clear. Section II.B argues that al-
though Justice Kennedy did advance new rhetoric regarding race in his
opinion, he likely believes that strict scrutiny should apply in cases where
school districts employ site selection and attendance-zone manipulation to
achieve diversity.
1394 (11 th Cir. 1993) (reaffirming the principle that the Equal Protection Clause bars only inten-
tional discrimination).
55. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) ("Once the racial imbalance due to the de
jure violation has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is
caused by demographic factors.").
56. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2832-34
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Cavalier v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying strict scrutiny
to the use of race in a school admissions policy); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197
F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a district court was required to adhere to the presumption
against racial classifications vis-A-vis a district's transfer program); Tasby v. Edwards, 799 F. Supp.
652 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that a school district could not relocate a Montessori magnet school
to relieve overcrowding when the magnet schools had already helped the Montessori program
achieve desegregation).
58. See Greenhouse, supra note 7; Godoy, supra note 6.
59. See Posting of Bryan Fair to Talking Justice, supra note 10.
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A. It Is Not Clear Whether a Majority of the Court
Would Demand Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court is divided about when to apply strict scrutiny to
government decision making about race. All the Justices agree that when a
state actor intends to segregate the races, courts must apply strict scrutiny to
ensure the state has a compelling interest and that its methods are narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest. The difficulty occurs when the state actor
intends to integrate the races. In that situation, the Justices are divided.
Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,
embrace the notion that "'all racial classifications ... must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny.' 60 Further, they maintain that the
Court "already rejected" the "view that classifications seeking to benefit a
disadvantaged racial group should be held to a lesser standard of review"
than those seeking to segregate the races. 6 ' For these four Justices, any racial
classification by a state actor, whether meant to include or exclude members
62
of a particular race, must face strict judicial scrutiny. This logic would ap-
ply when a state actor manipulates attendance zones or sites schools in an
effort to achieve racial diversity; by doing so the actor would be creating
zones "because of, and not merely in spite of, racial demographics. 63 In-
deed, Justices Thomas and Scalia argued in Bush v. Vera, a voting rights
case involving gerrymandered voting districts, that "[s]trict scrutiny applies
to all governmental classifications based on race, and we have expressly
held that there is no exception for race-based redistricting."' 6 Justices
Roberts and Alito affirmed this principle in Parents Involved.6 Thus, these
four Justices would require strict scrutiny of siting and rezoning decisions
designed to affect racial demographics as a matter of course.
For a second group of four-Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer-the courts should use strict scrutiny more sparingly. Justice
Breyer's dissent in Parents Involved argued for a "contextual approach to
scrutiny,' 66 in which courts apply a different standard of review depending
60. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2762-63 n. 16 (plurality opinion) (quoting Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
61. Id. at 2762.
62. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) ("We have insisted on strict scrutiny
in every context, even for so-called 'benign' racial classifications .... "); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 326 (2003) ("[A]II governmental action based on race-a group classification long recog-
nized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited-should be subjected to detailed
judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal fight to equal protection of the laws has not been in-
fringed." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
63. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1001 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. at 1000 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913-15 (1995)).
65. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751-52 ("[Rlacial classifications are simply too perni-
cious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
66. Id. at 2819 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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on whether a state actor is applying an exclusionary use of racial criteria 67 or
an inclusive use of such criteria. Where state actors intend to further segre-
gation, these Justices would apply strict scrutiny.69 By contrast, where local
regulations or policies impose "racial limits that seek, not to keep the races
apart, but to bring them together,"70 courts should apply a "standard of con-
stitutionality review that is less than 'strict.' ,7
What that standard would be is not entirely clear, although it seems to
embrace a balancing test that is less stringent than strict scrutiny. From
Justice Breyer's language in Parents Involved, the standard appears to move
away, without explanation, from the strict/intermediate scrutiny framework
of the past and would instead "require ... careful review" greater than a
mere rational basis test.72 Justice Breyer seems to hint that it would be some
kind of proportionality test, where the state's "use of race-conscious crite-
ria" is meant to achieve an important enough end "to overcome the risks"
associated with racial classifications. In opposition to the first group of
Justices, then, this group would evaluate the use of rezoning plans and
school site selection in order to achieve diversity using, as Justice Breyer
puts it, "a standard of review that is not 'strict' in the traditional sense of that
word.'7 4 In their view, courts need strict scrutiny to smoke out invidious in-
tent on the part of state actors, but when it is clear that schools are acting for
integrative-or benign-purposes, courts need not be as demanding. 5
As one might expect, lower courts trying to determine what test to apply
in these cases will have to look to Justice Kennedy to break the tie 6 His
view is not nearly as clear, or as soft, as rezoning advocates have argued, but
instead seems to be evolving. His stance is ambiguous, and his statements in
Parents Involved offer little illumination. Still, we can be certain of some
things. First, as with all the other Justices, Justice Kennedy would apply
strict scrutiny to any state programs that use race-conscious criteria to effect
67. Justice Breyer introduced the exclude/include distinction in this case, but the terms ap-
pear to be nothing more than another way of distinguishing between those programs that have
"invidious" (exclusive) or "benign" (inclusive) intent.
68. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2817.
69. See id. at 2817-19.
70. Id. at 2818.
71. Id. at 2819.
72. Id. In his dissent, Justice Stevens hinted at why the dissenters want to move away from
the strict/intermediate scrutiny dichotomy when he stated that the "Court's misuse of the three-tiered
approach to Equal Protection analysis merely reconfirms my own view that there is only one such
Clause in the Constitution.... [A] rigid adherence to tiers of scrutiny obscures Brown's clear mes-
sage." Id. at 2798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2819 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 246 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing the need for courts to acknowledge the difference between benign and invidious
discrimination).
76. See Charles Lane, Kennedy Seen as the Next Justice In Court's Middle; Alito Expected to
Tilt Conservative, WASH. PosT, Jan. 31, 2006, at A4.
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segregation.77 Regarding the use of race for integrative purposes, however,
Justice Kennedy's position is much more difficult to grasp. His conflicting
past jurisprudence on the issue signals a possible shift in his thinking,8 and
his statements in Parents Involved, while suggestive, are certainly not con-
crete.79 In the past, Justice Kennedy's statements and the opinions he has
joined have suggested his alignment with the pro-strict scrutiny group. In
Croson, for example, he favored a hard-line, clear rule that "would strike
down all preferences which are not necessary remedies to victims of unlaw-
ful discrimination."8 ° In other words, he wanted a rule even stricter than
strict scrutiny. For him, at the time, the only reason for the Court not to em-
brace fully "a rule of automatic invalidity for racial preferences in almost
every case" was because doing so "would be a significant break" from the
Court's precedents.8' He therefore reluctantly agreed to the more tepid rule
that "any racial preference must face the most rigorous scrutiny by the
courts."8'2
Similarly, in later cases, Justice Kennedy offered a spirited defense of
strict scrutiny as the "surest test the Court has yet devised for holding true to
the constitutional command of racial equality."8'3 He chastised the Court for
abandoning what he perceived as a fundamental rule: "strict scrutiny of all
racial classifications. ' ' He seemed to maintain this stance in Adarand,
where he joined an opinion by Justice O'Connor that stated that "all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.' 85 Even as
late as 2003, Justice Kennedy's dissent in Grutter opined that the "majority
proceeds to nullify the essential safeguard ... [of] rigorous judicial review,
with strict scrutiny as the controlling standard. 8 6 Thus, up to that time,
lower courts had no problem knowing exactly where Justice Kennedy stood
regarding the application of strict scrutiny to review the state's use of racial
criteria to achieve so-called integrative goals.
In part, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved strikes the
same chord, yet it seems to deviate in a confusing way. In evaluating the
school allocation programs at issue in that case, he expressly finds that they
"classify individuals by race and allocate benefits and burdens on that basis;
77. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
78. Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 104, 105 (2007).
79. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
81. Id. at 519.
82. Id.
83. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 634 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84. ld.
85. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
86. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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and as a result, they are to be subjected to strict scrutiny." 7 Taken by itself,
that language suggests his position has remained steady: any classification
by race demands strict scrutiny. Given that, his later remark that strict scru-
tiny may not be necessary in the site selection and rezoning cases is
somewhat puzzling.
Professor Heather Gerken suggests88 that something changed in Justice
Kennedy's views on race in 2006 when he wrote the lead opinion in League
of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC).89 Though the case does
not speak explicitly to the application of strict scrutiny in Equal Protection
cases, it does show a possible change in Justice Kennedy's views on race
and is therefore worth exploring. In LULAC, Professor Gerken argues,
Justice Kennedy celebrates the fact that Latinos in a particular voting district
"'had found an efficacious political identity.' 90 This is a radical departure
from his previous line of thought: in the past, Justice Kennedy had emphati-
cally rejected the notion that people of any one race can ever be assumed to
vote as a bloc or to have the same political interests. 9' Professor Gerken sees
this shift as a "softening" of Justice Kennedy's "views on race and race neu-
trality."9'
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved bolsters Professor
Gerken's claim, though it does not support it entirely. In it, Justice Kennedy
stated that a number of race-conscious practices by states to achieve diver-
sity-e.g., "strategic site selection of new schools" and "drawing attendance
zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods"-
would be "unlikely" to "demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible." 93
Professor Gerken argues that this position runs "directly contrary to [his]
prior equal protection jurisprudence. 94 If Professor Gerken is right, then it
would seem that Justice Kennedy has joined the set of Justices that em-
braces the contextual use of the strict scrutiny test.95 It is important to note,
however, that Justice Kennedy qualified his statement, merely arguing that it
96is "unlikely" the above techniques would demand strict scrutiny. This
qualification suggests that he is not fully committed to any one rule in the
context of school site selection and changing attendance zones. Rather, he
87. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2789 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
88. Gerken, supra note 78, at 109-10.
89. See 548 U.S. 399, 423-25 (2006).
90. Gerken, supra note 78, at 110 (quoting LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 108.
93. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
94. Gerken, supra note 78, at 105.
95. See Kaufman, supra note 5, at 3 (arguing that Justice Kennedy provides the crucial fifth
vote to allow school districts to use race-conscious criteria to achieve certain compelling interests).
96. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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may be open to the possibility of a less-stringent test and, more importantly,
to a "searching inquiry" into whether strict scrutiny is necessary.97
B. Justice Kennedy's Reasoning-Strict Scrutiny Is
More Likely than He Thinks
While Justice Kennedy suggests that strict scrutiny may not be necessary
when evaluating school site selection and rezoning plans, this Section ar-
gues that once the effects of those plans become clear, he will conclude that
it is. The Section will first lay out the language he uses and dissect it to
show the three areas that seem to be of most concern to Justice Kennedy. It
will then argue that each of those areas supports the application of strict
scrutiny in the school site selection and rezoning contexts.
1. Justice Kennedy's Language Suggests Three Areas of Concern
Justice Kennedy's language reveals his ambivalence and the issues about
which he is concerned. He says only that it is "unlikely"-not certain-that
siting or rezoning plans will encounter strict scrutiny, which suggests that he
may be open to considering a variety of arguments about when the test
should apply. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy briefly explains why he
believes the techniques he mentioned might not demand strict scrutiny:
These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment
based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by
race .... Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now
have considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permit-
ted to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional
violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a
given approach might have on students of different races. Assigning to
each student a personal designation according to a crude system of indi-
vidual racial classifications is quite a different matter; and the legal
analysis changes accordingly.98
97. Id. (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996)). 1 am not the only one to find
Justice Kennedy's statement less than a ringing endorsement of a more lenient test in these cases.
Professor Gerken, for example, inserts a note of caution in her argument:
It would be foolhardy ... to suggest that ... these two decisions signal a permanent shift in
Justice Kennedy's views. The gloss I offer here is decidedly mine, not Justice Kennedy's ....
There is a significant risk that by largely ignoring the anti-essentialist boilerplate in both opin-
ions, I underplay the continuity between these and Justice Kennedy's prior opinions. The parts
of his opinion I spin out here represent tentative gestures and initial instincts. Whether the
Justice ever pursues them remains to be seen.
Gerken, supra note 78, at 107-08. More importantly, those on the Court who would seem to benefit
most from Justice Kennedy's defection call attention to it with a tone that can best be described as
hesitant: "[aipparently Justice Kennedy also agrees that strict scrutiny would not apply in respect to
certain 'race-conscious' school board policies." Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2819 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
98. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy's reasoning touches on three key concerns that seem to
form the foundation of his new stance. First, he is concerned about the ef-
fects of classifying individual students by race; second, he is worried about
the ability of executive and legislative branches to perform the policies and
practices they have carried out for decades without worrying about constitu-
tional violations; and third, he is apprehensive about the type of legal
analysis courts use to scrutinize those policies and practices.
2. Rezoning and Site Selection Raise the Same Concerns
as Classifying Individuals by Race
A closer look at rezoning and school site selection shows that they
could, in many circumstances, have the same deleterious effects that worry
Justice Kennedy regarding the classification of individuals by race. As these
negative consequences become apparent, Justice Kennedy will find that
strict scrutiny is the only means by which courts can ensure that rezoning
and site selection do not divide the races.
In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy distinguished between race-
conscious decisions that define individual students by race-and let them
know they have been so defined-and those that are race conscious but do
not lead to different treatment of individuals. 99 The difference is subtle but
important. In the former case, individual students are pitted against individ-
ual students, and schools would use race as a factor to distinguish them.&°° In
the latter, individual students desiring a seat in a school or class would never
see race as a factor that led to their receiving or not receiving that seat. In
other words, while a policy maker might be aware of the effects a given
practice will have on different racial groups, individual students affected by
that practice will not feel as though race directly determined how they were
treated.
This concern with individual classifications is consistent with Justice
Kennedy's prior opinions and reasoning. As evidenced by his statements in
Croson'O' and Metro Broadcasting,102 he has always harbored trepidations
about government actions that provide burdens or benefits to individuals
based on their race. Further, in Adarand, race determined whether some
businesses received federal contracts while others did not-creating the pre-
cise type of classification that leads individuals to believe that they are defined
by their race and will receive benefits or burdens accordingly.0 3 If an individ-
ual is going to receive a preference or benefit from the state, it often follows
that someone else will not receive that benefit. Certain benefits, such as seats
99. Id.; see also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (holding that a city's plan to
close all public swimming pools rather than integrate did not violate the Constitution).
100. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2738; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394-95
(2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
101. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,520 (1989).
102. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990).
103. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205-08 (1995).
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in public schools, are finite, and only a limited number of individuals can
receive them. Justice Kennedy's view from previous cases, then, is that indi-
viduals who ultimately get those benefits must receive them for reasons
other than race, or else strict scrutiny should apply.
While Professor Gerken and others'04 see Justice Kennedy in Parents
Involved "softening"'0 5 his racial views, his language suggests he is merely
reiterating a long-held belief. His statements simply recognize what the
Court had already recognized in Arlington Heights and Washington v. Davis:
that government officials may design programs with a consciousness of the
impact on different racial groups but without intent to affect those racial
groups; such programs would not trigger strict scrutiny.'06 Justice Kennedy
is not changing his views; he is reemphasizing them.
Justice Kennedy's openness to a relaxed review of siting and rezoning
plans no doubt stems from his sense that these methods, as with changing
voting district lines, do not produce stigmatization, one of his chief con-
cerns. 0 7 Indeed, he suggests as much in Parents Involved when he quotes the
following from Bush v. Vera, a case dealing with manipulated voting district
lines: "Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is per-
formed with consciousness of race.... Electoral district lines are 'facially
race neutral' so a more searching inquiry is necessary before strict scrutiny
can be found applicable in redistricting cases than in cases of 'classification
based explicitly on race.' ,, Here, Justice Kennedy seems to equate redraw-
ing voting district lines with changing school attendance boundaries, and he
suggests that the effects of each are identical.
The analogy between locating an electoral district and locating a school
breaks down, however, when one engages in the "searching inquiry" Justice
Kennedy requires." 9 While the former may not have the same effects as
explicit racial classifications, the latter does. When those effects are coupled
with the state's integrative intent, Justice Kennedy's reasoning requires the
application of strict scrutiny. This is because site selection and attendance
zones dictate directly where a student may attend, which in turn affects
things like how far a student must travel, the type of friends he or she will
104. See Kaufman, supra note 5, at 13.
105. Gerken, supra note 78, at 108.
106. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)
("[Oifficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially dispropor-
tionate impact.... Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[Our cases
have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it re-
flects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact.").
107. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (approving of race-conscious mechanisms that do not tell "each student he
or she is to be defined by race").
108. Id. (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996)).
109. See, e.g., Michael Alison Chandler, Controversial Ruling May Lead to New Scrutiny,
WASH. PosT, Mar. 2, 2008, at C4 (reporting on a redistricting plan in Virginia that has led many
parents to promise litigation to stop it). I discuss this plan in more detail below.
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have, and the quantity and quality of the academic and athletic programs
available to the student. These factors do not arise once every few years
during an election cycle. They permeate, daily, every facet of a student's
life. They serve as ubiquitous reminders that students are where they are
because of the color of their skin." °
The geographic characteristics of school districts also counsel against
treating them the same as voting districts. Many urban areas in the United
States are divided into distinct racial neighborhoods that do not necessarily
lend themselves to attendance zones that will achieve racially diverse
schools."' Thus, siting a new school or changing the lines could result in a
diverse school for some areas but leave an overcrowded, racially homoge-
nous school in another area, especially in those situations when a populous
suburb in need of a new school does not border a racially different
neighborhood. Such a scenario would necessarily leave out various racial
groups because the housing patterns do not allow easy diversity-oriented
line drawing without forcing students in a given area to attend a lower qual-
ity school simply because their racial neighborhood was not easily included
in the new diverse school. " ' In any of these cases, the students on whom the
burden falls would have no choice but to ask why it was placed on them.
They need only look at their neighborhood, their peers, and the boundary
line itself to realize that the decision was based on race.
One might argue that because site selection and rezoning are facially
neutral, affected students and their families would never know that race was
a determinative factor, but this argument fails when juxtaposed with the re-
ality on the ground. It is conceivable that students and their families might
not have any reason to suspect race as a motivating factor. It is perhaps more
plausible that while they will be aware of the use of race when lines are first
drawn, that awareness will dissipate over time. This argument is compelling
because it raises the possibility that states could achieve diversity in schools
while avoiding the negatives of classification that worry Justice Kennedy-
stigmatization and "a new divisiveness" among the races." 3 The argument,
however, is belied by the experiences of real communities that have at-
tempted rezoning. As a recent example consider Fairfax County, Virginia,
110. While the voting lines cases do deal with the issue of minority mindset-something
Justice Kennedy seems deeply concerned about in the school diversity cases-they focus mostly on
refuting the notion that any one minority group will share the same mentality and therefore function
as a voting bloc.
They do not, however, address the underlying concern Justice Kennedy raises in the school di-
versity cases-how classifications by race cause individuals to perceive themselves and others. See
Vera, 517 U.S. at 958.
111. Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Neighborhood Racial-Composition Preferences: Evidence
from a Multiethnic Metropolis, 47 Soc. PROBS. 379, 380 (2000) (discussing thirty-seven metropoli-
tan areas across the United States that are now multiethnic in that they have significant segregated
populations of Whites, Latinos, Blacks, and Asians).
112. Chandler, supra note 12 (quoting parents who may move or send their children to private
schools in order to escape the effects of a rezoning plan in Virginia).
113. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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where the local school board proposed a plan to rezone a school district to
achieve more educational and demographic diversity." 4 There, the months-
long debate over the proposal resulted in "protests, threats of litigation and
allegations of collusion, race-baiting and flip-flopping," followed by par-
ents' wanting to sell their homes in order to avoid the effects of the new
boundary lines.1 6 Indeed, the Fairfax rezoning plan has created just the kind
of divisive, racially charged dialogue Justice Kennedy hopes to avoid.
These concerns will inevitably lead to the courts subjecting similar plans
to strict scrutiny. We can be sure that boundary changes will not escape pub-
lic notice, and even those with an integrative purpose can inadvertently lead
to racial division and stigmatization-as the experience of Fairfax County
makes clear."7 That reality diminishes the power of the analogy to voting
districts and suggests the courts will need strict scrutiny to ensure that any
given plan will in fact achieve its purpose of integration.
3. Applying Strict Scrutiny to Race-Motivated Plans Will Not Prevent State
Officials from Perfonning Their Necessary Duties
Because strict scrutiny will not hinder local officials in their necessary
duties, school districts should not interpret Justice Kennedy's concern
regarding how legislative and executive branches function as a statement
that strict scrutiny will not apply to rezoning or siting plans designed to
manipulate racial groups. Decisions regarding site selection of new schools
and drawing attendance zones have always been part of the business of local
government, and they always will be." 8 Justice Kennedy merely argues that
government should be able to make such decisions "with candor and with
confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur whenever a
decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have on
students of different races."' School districts should be careful not to read
too much into these statements. Certainly Justice Kennedy's concern is
legitimate, but it does not "open the door" for school officials to promote
diversity without strict judicial review."0 Rather, his opinion merely observes
that government actors must regularly make decisions regarding new schools
and school boundaries. 2 ' To impose on those actors the fear of a constitutional
violation every time they make a decision would increase their transaction
114. Chandler, supra note 12.
115. Chandler, supra note 109.
116. Chandler, supra note 12.
117. Chandler, supra note 109 (reporting on parents and administrators who have stated they
will be heavily involved in future rezoning plans, as well as moves by parents to oust school board
members who supported the rezoning plan in Virginia).
118. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. Id.
120. Posting of Bryan Fair to Talking Justice, supra note 10.
121. See United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing
the many reasons why a state actor may need to change boundaries).
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costs tremendously and perhaps prevent them from taking action necessary
for the improvement of public schools.
It should be noted, however, that the decision maker Justice Kennedy
wishes to protect and the decision maker that is the subject of the question
left open by Parents Involved are different in critical ways. The former, as
Justice Kennedy states, merely "considers the impact a given approach
might have on students of different races."'12 This decision maker would not
use race as the "predominate" motive, but would simply be mindful of it." 3
The latter, on the other hand, adopts an approach specifically because of the
effect it will have on students of different races. Indeed, the question left
open in Parents Involved explicitly assumes an actor whose primary purpose
is to bring "together students of diverse backgrounds and races."' 24 This ac-
tor does not merely consider the impact an approach may have on students
of different races; it wants to create that impact.
Adopting a rule that would apply strict scrutiny when integrative deci-
sions are made does not cripple executive and legislative branches when all
they do is consider race; rather, it warns them that if they intend to make
decisions that will affect students precisely because of their race, courts will
review those choices with strict scrutiny. Otherwise, they may operate
freely. Case law supports this proposition. In the post-Brown era, courts
have consistently upheld decisions by officials who have acted in "good
faith" without the intent to affect students because of race. 25 The Supreme
Court itself has remarked that "official action will not be held unconstitu-
tional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact....
Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause."' 26 It has further made clear that
discriminatory intent "implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."'27 Rezon-
ing and site selection plans, however, relate not to mere consciousness of
racial impact but to school districts' intent to manipulate students based on
122. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (stating that simply because legislatures
were aware of race in the redistricting process, it does not follow that race predominated in that
process).
124. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 171 F.3d 1333 (1 lth Cir. 1999) (holding that a facili-
ties plan that rejected a consolidated high school and instead provided for construction of two high
schools did not violate the desegregation order because, inter alia, the school board was not racially
motivated and acted in good faith); Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 778 F Supp. 1144, 1179 (W.D. Okla.
1991) ("Once a school system has been declared unitary, in order to establish a violation of equal
protection principles, a plaintiff must prove racially discriminatory intent or purpose.").
126. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); see
also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("But our cases have not embraced the proposi-
tion that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory
purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.").
127. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citations omitted).
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their race. That intent to affect students because of their race is what triggers
strict scrutiny in Justice Kennedy's way of thinking.
4. Justice Kennedy Is Not Calling for a More Lenient Standard
Justice Kennedy's statement that the "legal analysis" should change "ac-
cordingly" when school officials act with intent does not mean that he
embraces a more lenient standard for school site selection or rezoning de-
signed to affect students because of their race.12 ' He states that the "legal
analysis changes" when school officials leave the realm of making the same
types of decisions they have made for "generations" and begin classifying
individuals by race.'2 9 This is not a substantive shift in the law, and school
officials and others should not interpret it as calling for a more lenient stan-
dard. Whereas Justice Breyer's dissent calls for a more lenient standard,'30
Justice Kennedy is merely maintaining a long-held position.
Justice Breyer's approach is based on the difference between inclusive
and exclusive intent."' His analysis is not concerned with the everyday deci-
sions officials must make in order to keep a school system running, but with
the design of those officials to affect race relations. 32 In other words, Justice
Breyer assumes that the state's decision had racial diversity as one of its
driving motives, and in that scenario he calls for a less-than-strict standard
of review. 13
Justice Kennedy, however, is talking about decisions that are on a con-
tinuum, and he is concerned only about a portion of those decisions. On one
end are those that do not consider race at all but are driven by a multitude of
other concerns, such as economics, natural resources, overcrowding, avail-
ability of land, and transportation routes. At the other end lie those decisions
that are specifically designed to affect students of different racial groups.
Somewhere in between are those choices that are based on nonracial criteria
but are still conscious of the effect they may have on students of different
races. Justice Kennedy seems most concerned about this last category. His
language suggests that these decisions are a practical necessity for any
school district to run properly, and that too much interference from the
courts will create a great hindrance. Thus, he is merely acknowledging the
long-standing principle that a lesser standard of review would be required
should lawsuits arise. School officials should be wary to interpret his state-
ments as an endorsement of a lesser standard for intentional integrative
measures.
128. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 2816-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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Justice Kennedy, unlike Justice Breyer, engages in a discussion of strict
scrutiny the instant decisions by officials enter the realm of intentionally
affecting students because of their race. Until then, he seems focused on
practicality more than racial equality. Because of this, when he and Justice
Breyer separately argue for a less stringent standard of review, they are talk-
ing about different things. Justice Breyer would engage in a less stringent
review if, after finding that the state intends to affect students because of
race, he believes the state's purpose is inclusive. Justice Kennedy would
engage in a less stringent review only when a state's action is not motivated
by race, because he believes practicality-based decisions demand less judi-
cial review.
Justice Kennedy's concern with stigmatization and affording leeway
only to decisions that are necessarily race conscious but not race driven
demonstrates that he would apply strict scrutiny when school officials intend
to affect students on the basis of race. At that juncture, school officials may
be operating under pretext, or they may be choosing a method that is not
narrowly tailored to meet their stated compelling interest. As Justice
O'Connor-with Justice Kennedy joining-reasoned in Croson:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are
'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by il-
legitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the
114purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race ....
For Justice Kennedy, "'[M]ore than good motives should be required when
government seeks to allocate its resources by way of an explicit racial clas-
sification system.' ,135 Justice Kennedy's comment that rezoning and site
selection plans would be unlikely to demand strict scrutiny merely shows
that these programs appeared to him, at first glance, not to have the same
deleterious effects as explicit racial classifications. As Justice Kennedy no
doubt would discover upon a more "searching inquiry,"3 6 that is not always
the case. Accordingly, application of Justice Kennedy's broader jurispru-
dence will lead to strict scrutiny for such plans.
CONCLUSION
Parents Involved left many school districts across the country reeling,
unsure as to whether their school assignment plans would pass constitu-
tional muster, but Justice Kennedy has provided some hope, even if only a
sliver.3 7 Embedded among all the rhetoric and sniping between the Justices
was a call from the Court's swing vote for government leaders to "bring to
134. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
135. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (quoting Drew S. Days III,
Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 485 (1987)).
136. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137. See Godoy, supra note 6.
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bear the creativity of experts, parents, administrators, and other concerned
citizens to find a way to achieve" the compelling interest of a diverse stu-
dent body. 38 In issuing that call, Justice Kennedy listed some possibilities,
but those possibilities probably will face strict scrutiny. Indeed, they must,
for they raise the very concerns that have troubled the Court for decades.
Still, even with strict scrutiny as the applicable standard, Justice Kennedy's
message is hopeful: school districts should continue to strive to prepare
America's children for living in a pluralistic society, even if they must find a
narrowly tailored way to do it.
138. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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